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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
------0000000------

DENNIS RAY EDWARDS, A Minor,
by and through his Guardian ad Litem,
EDWARD EDWARDS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

15780

ANN BEARD DIDERICKSEN,
Defendant - Respondent.
------0000000------

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF
------0000000------

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by
appellant, Dennis Ray Edwards, a minor, by and through his guardian
ad litem, Edward Edwards, to recover damages from defendant/
respondent for injuries received in an automobile accident which
occurred on the 24th day of January, 1976.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury which found that the
defendant was not negligent, resulting in a verdict and judgment for
the defendant.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks affirmation of the lower court Judgment,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 24, 1976 the plaintiff and his brother, Danny,
left their parents residence in Honeyville, Utah to pick up Danny's
girl friend, Devon Taylor, who lived near Thatcher in Box Elder
County.

Danny was the owner and driver of the vehicle at all times

relevant to this case.

The plaintiff and Devon were passengers.

hrunediately prior to the accident, the driver was cautioned by both
passengers to slow down because he was exceeding the speed limit.
After picking up Devon, the three youths had proceeded
north on State Route 102, and approximately one and a half miles
south of the Thatcher Church on State Route 102, the Edwards vehicle
was involved in a collision with another vehicle driven by the defendant,

Ann Beard Didericksen.
Prior to the accident there was some horse play in the
Edwards vehicle while the group was traveling north on State Route
102.

The horse play involved the driver's right hand being pulled

such that the vehicle swerved on to the berm and gyrated back and
forth across the road.
At trial, the plaintiff attempted to show that the accident
had been caused when the defendant made a left hand turn from the
highway into the driveway of her residence in front of the Edwards
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vehicle.

Defendant however introduced evidence showing that eye-

witnesses had observed the Edwards vehicle traveling at an excessive
rate of speed and apparently out of control.

Michael Alan Grimsby

testified that he observed the Edwards vehicle out of control one mile
prior to the accident site.

Peter C. Peterson testified that he saw

the Edwards vehicle out of control a few hundred feet prior to the
accident site.

The defendant testified that she approached the place

where she was to turn into the driveway of her home, signaling her
intention to make a left hand turn and came to a stop on the roadway.
She observed the Edwards vehicle approaching from the south fishtailing or swerving back and forth on the roadway or otherwise ~ut of
control and decided if she stayed stopped on the roadway she would
be struck by the Edwards vehicle.

In an effort to avoid being struck

by the oncoming car defendant proceeded to make a left turn off the
roadway and into her driveway.

The Edwards vehicle swerved into

the borrow pit and hit the defendant's vehicle which had entered the
defendant's driveway.
Plaintiff's vehicle was a 1962 Thunderbird which was ten
(10) months overdue for a safety inspection, which had a disconnected
power steering pump, and mismatched tires consisting of a fifteen
inch (15 ") tire on the front left wheel of the vehicle and fourteen inch
(14") tires on the other wheels.

The road where the accident occurred

was straight and level and afforded a clear and unobstructed view for
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both drivers of at least two hundred (200) yards.

At the fune of the

accident, the paveillent was clear and dry.
Plaintiff presented Officer Larry Forsgren of the Utah
Highway Patrol at the trial.

Forsgren arrived at the scene shortly

after the accident occurred and completed an accident investigation.
At trial he gave an extensive and complete account of the observations and investigation which he made regarding the accident.

The

jury was shown the pictures that were taken of the accident site, his
conclusions concerning the path taken by the Edwards vehicle, the
appro:xim.ate speed of the Edwards vehicle in the moments prior to
impact and his conclusions concerning the principal point of impact.
On objection, what the trial Judge prohibited him from stating was his
opinion about which of the parties were at fault in causing the accident.
The trial Judge ruled that the jury was capable of reviewing the evidence
and accurately determining fault.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE
JURY WAS COMPETENT TO REACH A CORRECT
JUDGMENT WITHOUT THE OFFICER'S OPINION
AS TO WHICH PARTY WAS AT FAULT WAS PROPER
AND IS CONSISTENT WITH PRECEDENT BOTH IN
UTAH AND IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS.

POINT I
Prior Utah cases have held that the exclusion of an expert's opinion as to which party was at fault was proper.
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In its Brief plaintiff properly states that an expert may
express an opinion on causation even if the opinion goes to the
ultilnate fact and issue in question.

However, plaintiff failed to

focus upon the requirement that the opinion be in an area where a
juror is likely to prove incapable of forming a correct judgment
without skilled assistance.
In Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123 Utah 515, 260

P.2d 549 (1953), the court stated the following general rule:
1
•
•
• opinions as to the cause of a
particular occurrence or accident given
by witnesses possessing peculiar skill
or knowledge--that is, experts--are
admissible where the subject matter is
not one of conunon observation or knowledge, or in other words, where witnesses
because of peculiar knowledge are competent
to reach an intelligent conclusion and inexperienced persons are likely to prove
incapable of forming a correct judgment
without skilled assistance.' Id. at 552.
[Emphasis added.]
-

The issue in Hooper was whether or not a wheel was
defective.

Having observed certain characteristics of the wheel in

question, the expert was then asked his professional opinion as to
whether or not these characteristics signified a defective wheel.
This Court concluded that such a conclusion required a degree of
sophistication of which the average juror was incapable.
In its Brief, plaintiff has focused upon whether or not

an expert may offer an opinion which goes to the ultilnate issue in
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question.

Admittedly Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, '4,

allows such an opinion, but only when such an opinion is "otherwise
admissible." The Hooper standard as affirmed in Joseph v. W. H.
Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P. 2d 330 (1957)
and Stagrneyer v. Leatham Bros., Inc., 20 Utah 2d 421, 439 P. 2d
279 (1968) requires as one of the elements that an opinion to be
"otherwise admissible" be in a field where the average juror would
be unable to evaluate the evidence and render a correct judgment
without the assistance of the skilled experts opinion.
In the instant case the jury was asked to decide whether
the accident was caused by the defendant negligently turning in front
of the vehicle in which the plaintiff was riding, or whether it was
caused by the Edwards vehicle hurdling towards the defendant's and
hitting the defendant's vehicle in the defendant's driveway after the
defendant had made an emergency turn into her driveway in a fruitless attempt to avoid being struck by the onrushing out-of-control
vehicle.
In making that determination the jury had before it evidence from all three occupants of the Edwards vehicle, Mrs.
Didericksen, a neighbor who witnessed the accident, an individual
parked along side the road who had observed the Edwards vehicle
swerve across the road and narrowly avoid hitting him approximately
one (1) mile prior to the accident and the testimony of Officer Forsgren.
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As noted earlier, Officer Forsgren testified extensively concerning
all of the observations which he made of the accident scene, the
questions he asked of the participants following the accident, the
photographs he took of the accident scene, the conclusions which he
had reached concerning the location of the vehicles at impact, the
path taken by the Edwards vehicle prior to impact, his estimation as
to the speed of the Edwards vehicle in the moments before impact,
etc.
The .final question to be resolved after the presentation
of all the evidence by both parties was this: Was the Edwards vehicle
swerving out of control before or after the defendant began "the turn
into her driveway?

The jury needed no expert's opinion regarding

this point: It was in a position to weigh the evidence and decide which
version of the facts was to be believed.

Accordingly, Officer Forsgren 1 s

opinions concerning fault were unnecessary and properly excluded by
the trial court.
In Macshara v. Garfield, 20 Utah 2d 152, 434 P. 2d 756
(1967) this court decided the identical issue raised on appeal by
plaintiff and resolved it in favor of excluding the officer's conclusions
concerning causation.

Macshara involved

an automobile

accident

where the issue presented was which party entered the intersection
first.

At trial, the trial judge refused to allow a traffic officer to in

effect reconstruct the accident from his interpretation of the physical
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evidence and make his conclusion as to which party entered the intersection first.

In affirming the trial court's ruling this court stated:
• • • We think the trial court was correct
in not allowing the officer to in effect reconstruct the accident and the speed and
direction of the vehicles on the basis of
such physical evidence as: gouge marks on
the lawn and on the curbing, the damage to
the automobiles, and the course he assumed
they took after the impact. The disallowance
of the evidence was in conformity with the
rule that such an opinion is not addrnis sible
if a laynian of ordinary intelligence can just
as well interpret the evidence as the experts. In this connection it should be
observed that all of the complete evidence,
including photographs taken of the vehicles,
were before the jury. Andfurther, that the
trial court did allow the officer to give his
observations as to the damage to the
vehicles and its causation, and to give his
estimate of their speed based upon the skid
marks. Id. at 757. [Emphasis added.]

Macshara is directly in point with the instant case. In
Macshara the question was which party entered the intersection first;
in the instant case the issue is did the defendant initiate her turn
before or after the Edwards vehicle began swerving across the roadway.

As in Macshara, the officer in the instant case was permitted

to give his observations concerning the path taken by the Edwards
vehicle, the speed of the Edwards vehicle, and the probable point
of impact.

Plaintiff has raised no issues which distinguished the in-

stant case from Macshara.

Accordingly, in the instant case the trial

court's judgment should be affirmed.
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This Court has acknowledged that the trial court is to be
given wide discretion in its rulings upon the admissibility of expert's
opinions.

Marsh v. Irvine, 22 Utah 2d 154, 449 P. 2d 996 (1969) in-

volved a suit by a passenger against the driver of the vehicle in which
the plaintiff was riding and against the driver of another automobile
who collided with the first vehicle.

At trial, the judge admitted and

excluded portions of the testimony of two experienced police officers
who were involved in the investigation of the accident.

On appeal

defendant Irvine argued that the trial court had been incorrect in its
decisions as to which portions of the testimony should be accepted
and which excluded.

This court stated:

• Without belaboring the detail
thereof we make the following general
observations which are controlling here.
When it appears that the determination
of an issue will be aided by knowledge of
something which is not generally known
by laymen, it is in order to permit one
who has specialized knowledge on the subject, and thus may properly be called an
expert, to testify concerning his knowledge
and/or his opinion to provide better understanding of the situation. Because of his
position as the authority in charge of the
trial, the trial judge should be allowed a
reasonable latitude of discretion both as
to the necessity for such expert testimony
and as to the qualification of the witness
to give it. We are not persuaded that he
transgressed the bounds of reason or
abused his discretion here. Id. at 999.
[Emphasis added.]
In the instant case plaintiff has cited no cases which hold
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that the exclusion of an officer's opinion concerning causation on
facts siznilar to those of the instant case consitituted an abuse of
discretion.

Rather, plaintiff asserts without authority that the aver-

age juror would be incapable of analyzing the causation question on
the basis of the evidence presented by the police officer and other
witnesses.

This assertion is contrary to the decisions reached by

this court in Macshara and Marsh.

Consistent with those cases this

Court should affirm the trial court's ruling.

POINT II
The trial court's exclusion of the officer's opinion on
causation is consistent with decisions in other jurisdictions.
Lollis v. Superior Sales Co., Inc., 580 P. Zd 423 (Kan.,
1978) involved a suit by a motorcyclist for injuries he sustained
when his motorcycle, which had been following a beer truck, collided
with the right rear side of the truck as it was making a right turn.
Under Kansas Rules of Evidence opinion testimony of
experts on ultimate issues is admissible when the opinion will aid
the jury in the interpretation of technical facts or when it will assist
the jury in understanding material in issue.

The Kansas court stated:

• • • We have no quarrel with the rule
recognized in Spraker v. Lankin, supra,
that experienced police officers and reconstruction experts, having the requisite
experience and training, should be permitted to express opinions as to the speed
of vehicles involved in highway collisions
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when based upon the evidence observed
at the scene of the accident, including
direction of travel, skid marks, point of
iinpact, damages to the vehicles, and the
location in which the vehicles came to
rest. We have concluded, however, that
a highway patrolman or other expert may
not properly state either his opinion as to
which of the parties was at fault in causing
an accident or his opinion concerning what
actions of the parties contributed to the
accident. .!!!:__at 431. [Emphasis added. J

The instant case raised the identical issue resolved by
the Kansas Court.

In the instant case the investigating officer was

permitted to testify as to all of his findings but was not permitted
to testify as to his conclusion concerning the causation of the accident.

In both the instant case and Lollis the situation was one
where the normal experience and qualifications of layTnan jurors
would have enabled them to draw proper conclusions without the aid
of expert conclusions or opinions and accordingly expert's opinion
on causation were properly excluded.
Bailey v. Rhodes, 276 P. Zd 713 (Ore., 1954) involved a
suit by a guest for injuries sustained in an automobile accident against
the driver of the automobile alleging negligence on the grounds of
successive speed and intoxication.

The trial court allowed an investi-

gating officer to testify to his conclusions concerning the defendant's
rate of speed at the tiine of the accident.

The Oregon Supreme Court
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reversed stating that:
• A jury is as well able to draw its
own inferences and reach its own conclusions from the facts presented . • •
Id. at 719.

In Kelso v. Independent Tank Co., 348 P. 2d 855 (Okla.,
1960) the Oklahoma Court stated that:
• • • Where the cause of a motor vehicle
collision is within the knowledge and understanding of ordinary persons, it is an
ultimate issue for the jury, and it is prejudicial error to admit expert opinion
testimony on such issue, over objection of
opposing party. Id. at 856.
Although some courts have excluded evidence on the basis
that it goes to the "ultimate issue" in the case, the underlying basis
of the exclusion is that the opinion evidence being offered is not
necessary for a jury to properly decide the case.

In Kelso, despite

the use of the term "ultimate issue" by the court, the court made
clear, as is reflected in the above quoted citation, that the opinion
evidence was being excluded because it was within the knowledge and
understanding of ordinary persons and consequently was not required
by the jury.
The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized and adopted the
above discussed principle.

In Meyst v. East Fifth Avenue Service,

Inc., 401 P. Zd 430 (Alas., 1965) the court affirmed the trial court's
exclusion of an expert's opinion on causation of the automobile acciden~
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The court ruled that the expert's opinion was properly excluded not
because it went to the ultimate issue or invaded the province of the
jury, but because the jury could make its own independent determination as to the cause of the accident on the basis of the other evidence
introduced at trial.
CONCLUSION
All of the above discussed cases reached the identical
decision that was reached by the trial court in the instant case.

All

of the cases involved automobile accidents and a determination as to
which party caused the accident.

In all of the cases the Appellate

Court concluded that an expert's opinion as to causation of the automobile accident should be excluded because the jury was in a position
to determine causation on the basis of the evidence available to it.
In Macshara this court specifically adopted the position
taken by defendant in the instant case and ruled that the exclusion of
the expert's opinion as to causation was proper.

The position of

Macshara is consistent with case law in other jurisdictions.

Plaintiff

has cited no cases in which a contrary concludion was reached.

The

Hooper case cited by plaintiff is distinguishable from the instant case
because Hooper required a decision as to whether or not a wheel was
defective.

Determination of the defective condition of a product is

substantially different from determining which of two parties' actions
were responsible for causing the accident.

The thrust of plaintiff's
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argument is that the officer's opinion on causation was excluded because
it was an ultiniate issue.

Plaintiff argues further that "ulfunate issue"

evidence is admissible and hence that the trial court
in excluding the opinion evidence.

corruni:~ed

error

However, as this Court has pointed

out in Joseph, supra, the funda.m.ental issue is not whether the opinion '
evidence goes to the ultiniate issue before the jury, but whether or
not the opinion evidence is otherwise admissible, i.e., is the subject
of inquiry beyond the field of knowledge generally possessed by laymen.
Id. at 334.
Plaintiff fails to pass this test.

The trial court properly

ruled that the jury was in a position to reach a knowledgeable conclusion
as to the individuals responsible for the accident in the instant case.
The jury had before it the testiniony of the participants, eyewitnesses,
and Officer Forsgren concerning the facts he found upon his investigation and his conclusions concerning the path of the Edwards vehicle and
the principal point of impact.

His opinion concerning causation was

not necessary for the jury to reach an accurate decision.
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For these reasons defendant respectfully requests that
the judgment of the court below be affirmed.

KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
600 Commercial Club Building
3 2 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 521-3773
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
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